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The interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on audit quality 
 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the impact of firm and partner tenure on audit quality, where audit 
quality is proxied by discretionary accruals. We study a sample of Spanish listed companies 
between 2005-2011 and address both the individual and the interaction effects of firm and 
partner tenure. Our study is motivated by the current debate, particularly intense at the EU 
level, on the impact of the auditor rotation regime on the quality of auditing. We find that, 
without considering the interaction effects, firm and partner tenure do not seem to play a 
relevant role as determinants of audit quality. Importantly, the interaction of firm and partner 
tenure shows stronger effects on audit quality than both forms of tenure separately considered. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that audit quality is maximized when medium firm and partner 
tenures interact. However, results for the interaction variables are sensitive to the accruals 
estimation method.  
 







The potentially competing effects of tenure on audit quality are implicit in DeAngelo’s (1981) 
definition of audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor will both detect and report 
material misstatements. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) suggest that lengthy auditor-client 
relationships may impair independence because the auditor's objectivity towards the client 
would diminish with the passage of time. Similarly, Hoyle (1978) contends that the audit 
program might become a mere routine in lengthy audit engagements. These concerns are 
summarised by Shockley (1981, p. 789), who notes that ‘complacency, lack of innovation, less 
rigorous audit procedures and a developed confidence in the client may arise after a long 
association with the client’. The closeness of the relationship between auditors and clients is 
also recognized by the IFAC Code of Ethics as a threat to independence: ‘(….) a familiarity threat 
occurs when, by virtue of a close relationship with an assurance client, its directors, officers or 
employees, a firm or a member of the assurance team becomes too sympathetic to the client’s 
interests’ (IFAC Code of Ethics ED 2003, p. 18). However, the potential loss of independence 
associated with long audit tenures needs to be balanced against other arguments suggesting 
that longer tenures may also improve audit quality, because the competence of auditors is 
expected to increase with tenure. Accordingly, Myers et al. (2005) argue that financial reporting 
problems are more likely to occur early in the auditor-client relationship, when the auditor is 
less familiar with the client’s business, processes and risks.  
Nevertheless, regulators seem to pay more attention to the negative impact of long tenures 
on independence than to positive effects on competence, and thus many countries have 
implemented mandatory rotation rules, generally at the partner level, with the aim of improving 
audit quality. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter “SOX Act”) accelerated the 
mandatory rotation of the audit partner. Similarly, member states of the EU were required to 
adapt national legislations to the 2006 revised 8th Company Law Directive. The directive 
established the mandatory rotation of the lead audit partner after a maximum seven-year 
period. However, the Green Paper on auditing (hereafter “Green Paper”) issued by the European 
Commission (EC) posed serious concerns regarding the sufficiency of the new regulatory 
framework to adequately guarantee independence (EC 2010). Only four years after the release 
of the Green Paper, the Directive 2014/56/EU and the Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 (hereafter 
“2014 EU Regulation”) imposed mandatory rotation at both firm and partner levels. 
This paper aims to extend the available evidence on the impact of audit tenure on the quality 




address the interaction effects of both forms of tenure. In line with prior studies (e.g. Myers et 
al. 2003, Lim and Tan 2010), audit quality is proxied by discretionary accruals. While 
discretionary accruals is the usual proxy for audit quality, it should be noted that, as pointed out 
by Francis (2004), the measurement of audit quality is a controversial issue and all proxies used 
in the literature are subject to potential limitations.1 The empirical analysis is based on a sample 
of Spanish listed companies for the period 2005-2011. This paper is motivated by the current 
debate, particularly intense at the EU level, on the impact of the auditor rotation regime on audit 
quality. We aim to contribute to this debate.  
While the impact of audit firm tenure on audit quality has been widely investigated, 
evidence at the partner level is relatively scarce and limited to just a few countries. More 
importantly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to focus on the interaction 
effects of both forms of tenure. We consider this a meaningful issue, as the impact of partner 
tenure on audit quality may depend on firm tenure. We argue that one year of partner tenure 
will not necessarily involve the same implications for audit quality under, for example, one or 
twenty years of firm tenure. In the first case, the audit firm, audit team and lead partner will be 
completely unfamiliar with the new client. Yet, in the second case, although the client is new for 
the partner, it is well known by the audit firm (and probably also by part of the audit team). In 
this latter case, part of the client knowledge will be transferred to the new partner (Ferguson, 
et al. 2003). Thus, although partner tenure is one year in both cases, the implications for audit 
quality would likely be different.2 Moreover, the examination of interaction effects could reveal 
hidden effects which would never come out whether both forms of tenure were studied 
separately. 
It should be noted that prior research on firm and partner tenure has not consistently 
reported strong results on such relationships (e.g. Chi and Huang 2005, Carey and Simnett 2006, 
Manry et al. 2008, Chi et al. 2009). However, as these studies have not analysed the interaction 
effects of both forms of tenure, the conclusion that audit tenure does not affect audit quality 
may be too hasty. This would be the case, for example, if the effects of both forms of tenure 
were weak but in the same direction.3 In such a situation, when the two weak effects are added 
                                                          
1 See Francis (2004) and Defond and Francis (2005) for a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of 
discretionary accruals as a measure of audit quality, and Campa and Donnelly (2016) for a new alternative 
measure of audit quality. 
2 A similar explanation can be used to justify that the impact of partner tenure on the “independence” 
dimension of audit quality will likely be conditioned by audit firm tenure. 
3 Such behaviour could be expected according to the competence-independence framework used in the 




through the interaction variables, results may become significant, indicating that audit tenure is 
sometimes relevant.  Accordingly, the analysis of the interaction effects may provide a clearer 
and more complete picture of the influence of audit tenure on audit quality and, therefore, this 
constitutes a natural extension of prior research.4   
DeFond and Francis (2005) encouraged the study of audit quality at the individual auditor 
level in those markets where data are available. Two characteristics of the Spanish audit market 
might enhance the interest of this study at the EU level. Firstly, the potentially negative effects 
of long tenures on audit quality may be more clearly observed in low litigation risk countries 
such as Spain (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 2004), because incentives to maintain independence are 
weaker in these countries compared to high litigation settings (Hope and Langli 2010). Secondly, 
because of the concern of EU regulators about the potentially negative implications of extremely 
long audit firm tenures,5 countries such as Spain, characterized by relatively long firm tenures, 
provide an interesting research setting. On the contrary, the short firm tenures reported in some 
prior studies6 may make it difficult to adequately address the impact of long firm tenure on audit 
quality, or even the effects of long partner tenures under long firm tenures. Finally, it should 
also be noted that unlike most prior research at the EU level, our evidence is obtained under a 
mandatory partner rotation rule.7 As partner rotation is currently mandatory in the EU, it seems 
timely to update the available evidence to this regulatory framework. 
We do not observe significant effects of firm or partner tenure on audit quality, when both 
forms of tenure are examined individually. However, for the interaction variables we find some 
significant effects in the predicted direction. Moreover, we report some evidence that audit 
quality is maximized when medium firm tenure interacts with medium partner tenure. These 
results suggest it is necessary to address the interaction of firm and partner tenure when 
investigating the influence of tenure on audit quality. However, it should also be noted that our 
                                                          
4 In a similar way as the inclusion of a firm tenure variable in the analysis of partner tenure allows to better 
understand the impact of partner tenure on audit quality. When audit firm tenure is not included in the 
model, the partner tenure variable will also be capturing the effects of the omitted firm tenure variable. 
Thus, results may be misleading. 
5 ‘Situations where a company has appointed the same audit firm for decades seem incompatible with 
desirable standards of independence’. (EC 2010, p. 11). 
6 For example, the average audit firm tenure is 5.7 years in Chi and Huang (2005), 6.9 years in Chen et al. 
(2008) and 6.9 years in Lim and Tan (2010). 
7 As an exception, Hohenfels (2016) investigates the impact of audit firm tenure on audit quality under 
mandatory partner rotation in the German audit market. However, the author does not use discretionary 




results on the importance of the interaction effects are sensitive to the accruals estimation 
procedure. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section two summarises recent policy developments on 
auditor rotation. Section three outlines a review of the literature and introduces the 
development of our hypotheses. In section four, the research design is presented, followed by 
the discussion of results in section five. Finally, conclusions and limitations of our research, as 
well as the implications of our findings, are drawn. 
2. The regulation of audit firm and partner rotation 
Many countries have enacted mandatory rotation rules at the partner level. Following the 
SOX Act, the US accelerated mandatory partner rotation from seven to five years and also 
extended the mandated cooling-off period before the partner can return to the engagement 
from two to five years. Furthermore, the SOX Act also extended such rotation requirements to 
the engagement quality review partner. Similarly, the 2006 revised 8th Company Law Directive 
established a maximum tenure of seven years for lead audit partners in the EU, although 
member states could impose a shorter maximum tenure. Other important economic 
jurisdictions such as China, Japan or Australia have also enacted mandatory rotation rules at the 
partner level.8 
Unlike the regulation of partner rotation, just a small number of countries have established 
the mandatory rotation of the audit firm in the past (Ewelt-Knauer et al. 2013). However, shortly 
after the approval of the 2006 Directive, the sufficiency of the new regulatory framework to 
guarantee independence was put into question. According to the Green Paper, one of the main 
threats to the effective independence of external auditors was that mandatory rotation had 
been established only at the partner level. As stated by the Green Paper: ‘Even when ‘key audit 
partners’ are regularly rotated as currently mandated by the Directive, the threat of familiarity 
persists. In this context, the mandatory rotation of audit firms –not just of audit partners– should 
be considered’. (EC 2010, p. 11). Following this concern, in May 2014 the EU Regulation 
establishing the mandatory rotation of the audit firm for public interest entities9 was published 
in the Official Journal of the EU. The new regulation establishes that neither the initial 
                                                          
8 Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive discussion on the different auditor rotation regimes. 
9 Public interest entities are defined as: a) entities that are both governed by the law of a member state 
and listed on a regulated market; b) all credit institutions in the EU; c) all insurance companies; d) any 
company designated by member states as public interest entities, for instance because of the nature of 
business, size, or number of employees. The 2014 EU Regulation will affect at least the 142 listed 




engagement of a particular statutory auditor or audit firm, nor this in combination with any 
renewed engagements shall exceed a maximum duration of ten years. Nevertheless, member 
states may extend the initial term to a maximum of 20 years if a public tendering process for the 
statutory audit is conducted and takes effect upon the expiry of the maximum duration period, 
and to 24 years where, after the expiry of the maximum duration more than one statutory 
auditor or audit firm is simultaneously engaged. 
In Spain, the Ley de Auditoría de Cuentas (Audit Law) was enforced in 1988 as a direct 
response to the revised 8th Company Law Directive. The Audit Law established a three-to-nine-
year contract with the audit firm and, in order to strengthen independence, the mandatory 
rotation of the audit firm at the end of the initial contract. Nevertheless, following a legal reform 
in 1995, the mandatory rotation of the audit firm was abolished and, in fact, never applied.10 
After this reform, auditors could be engaged for the same three-to-nine-year initial period but, 
after the expiration of the initial contract, the renewal of the engagement could be done on a 
year by year basis. Similar to the SOX Act in the US, the Ley Financiera (Financial Law) was passed 
in 2002 as a direct reaction to the corporate financial scandals of the nineties. During the Law’s 
approval process an amendment limiting the duration of the engagement with the audit firm to 
a maximum of 12 years was added. Besides, a minimum three-year cooling-off period was 
required to re-hire the audit firm. However, as the 1995 reform revoking the mandatory rotation 
of the audit firm, strong criticism from the auditing profession led to the eventual withdrawal of 
the amendment. A maximum seven-year tenure was finally imposed to the audit team, without, 
however, affecting the audit firm. The maximum tenure of seven years for the lead partner was 
maintained by the 2011 reform of the Audit Law, however, without requiring the rotation of the 
whole audit team. This reform also changed the tacit year by year renewal of the initial contract 
with the audit firm for tacit reappointments for periods of three years. Finally, following the 
2014 EU Regulation, a new Audit Law was passed in 2015. The new Law enacts a maximum 
tenure of five years with the lead partner and of ten years with the audit firm. However, in the 
latter case the period may be further extended for four more years, provided that a second audit 
firm is contracted to perform joint audits during this period. Table 1 summarises the regulatory 
changes of firm and partner tenure in the Spanish audit market. 
 
                                                          
10 As the Spanish Audit Law enacted in 1988 imposed the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after nine 
years of tenure and being 1988 the first year under the mandatory rotation rule, 1997 would have been 
the first year in which audit firms would have been compelled to rotate. However, the enactment of the 





Insert Table 1 around here 
 
3. Review of the literature and hypothesis development 
Following DeAngelo’s (1981) definition of audit quality, the ability to detect misstatements 
will be greater when the auditor has deeper client knowledge and, undoubtedly, this knowledge 
increases with tenure through a “learning curve effect” (e.g. Knapp 1991, Johnson et al. 2002). 
This is also the view of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) when states 
that ‘audit quality may suffer in the early years of an engagement’ (PCAOB 2011, p.3). However, 
the auditor’s willingness to report the detected misstatements could also be lower in longer 
relationships, due to the so-called “familiarity effect”. Hence, the Independence Standards 
Board (ISB 2000) identifies familiarity with the client as a major threat to independence. 
Supporting this view, the results of the analysis proposed by Bamber and Iyer (2007) to explain 
auditor-client relationships suggest that identification with a client is more likely to lead to 
acquiescence to the client preferred position. 
According to the former discussion, the final impact of tenure on audit quality will depend 
on which effect prevails. From the perspective of psychology, learning theorists advocate that 
performance generally improves as a power function of practice (e.g. Glaser and Bassok 1989, 
Ritter and Schooler 2001). That means rapid improvements in performance in the early stages 
of practice, though diminishing returns associated with additional practice. Therefore, we would 
expect a learning curve where the positive effects of tenure on competence will weaken after 
the initial years of engagement. Conversely, the familiarity effect will likely occur more gradually 
through the auditor-client relationship. Long tenures might weaken auditor objectivity (Mautz 
and Sharaf 1961), strengthen confidence in the client (Shockley 1981) and, as a result, 
undermine audit quality. However, it takes time to build up confidence and to identify with the 
client. This is clearly stated by Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 208): ‘the greatest threat to [their] 
independence is a slow, gradual, almost casual erosion of [their] honest disinterestedness’. 
Therefore, the joint effect of a relatively steep learning curve in the first years of engagement 
and a slow and gradual erosion of independence with tenure suggests that audit quality is 
maximized in medium tenures.  
Extant empirical evidence generally supports a positive effect of audit firm tenure on audit 
quality as measured by the quality of earnings. Hence, a first set of papers finds evidence that 
discretionary accruals are negatively and significantly related to tenure (e.g. Johnson et al. 2002, 




other studies have shown a non-monotonic effect of tenure on earnings quality, since 
discretionary accruals increase during the early years of tenure with the audit firm, but decrease 
afterwards (Davis et al. 2009). Although the aforementioned papers investigate the US audit 
market, the evidence available for other countries also suggests a positive effect of tenure on 
audit quality. Hence, for the Taiwanese market, Chi and Huang (2005) and Chen et al. (2008) 
conclude that discretionary accruals significantly decrease with tenure. Similarly, available 
evidence for the French (Piot and Janin 2007) and Australian (Fargher et al. 2008) markets also 
provides some support for an increase of earnings quality with tenure. Evidence for Spain shows 
either negative (Monterey and Sanchez 2007) or non-monotonic (Jara and Lopez 2007) effects 
of tenure on discretionary accruals. In the same way, studies using other proxies of audit quality 
suggest a positive (or neutral) impact of tenure on audit quality, as measured by material 
misstatements (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984, Carcello and Nagy 2004), going-concern modified 
opinions (Louwers 1998, Geiger and Raghunandan 2002, Vanstraelen 2002, Knechel and 
Vanstraelen 2007) or earnings restatements (Stanley and DeZoort 2007).  
After the theoretical analysis of the potential positive and negative effects of tenure on audit 
quality and the review of the available evidence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis # 1 (H1): the maximum level of audit quality is achieved under medium audit 
firm tenure.  
The “experience versus familiarity” framework used to develop hypothesis H1 can also be 
used to analyse the implications of partner tenure. As a matter of fact, as both “learning effect” 
and “familiarity effect” are largely intrinsic to the audit partner, this theoretical framework 
seems particularly suitable to analyse the effects of partner tenure. Hence, following the 
previous discussion on the implications of firm tenure, audit quality should be maximized in 
medium partner tenures. As we discussed in the introductory section, only a few papers have 
addressed the effects of partner tenure on audit quality. The available evidence is limited to the 
US (Manry et al. 2008), Australia (Carey and Simnett 2006, Fargher et al. 2008) and Taiwan (Chi 
and Huang 2005, Chen et al. 2008, Chi et al. 2011).  
Manry et al. (2008) report that discretionary accruals are significantly and negatively 
associated with the lead audit partner’s tenure, thus suggesting a positive impact of partner 
tenure on audit quality. However, statistical significance was weak and reported only for small 




Extant research for the Australian audit market suggests a negative effect of partner tenure 
on audit quality. Hence, Fargher et al. (2008) observe lower managers’ accounting discretion in 
the initial years of tenure of a new audit partner of the same firm. Moreover, although Carey 
and Simnett (2006) do not find significant effects of tenure on discretionary accruals, they report 
a lower proportion of clients missing breakeven for long partner tenure observations, thus 
suggesting a greater ability to manage earnings in order to report a profit, during later years of 
tenure.  
The available evidence for Taiwan generally shows a positive impact of partner tenure on 
audit quality. Hence, Chi and Huang (2005) conclude that earnings quality initially increases with 
tenure but then decreases, with five years being the cut-off point. However, after including in 
the model audit firm tenure the coefficients on partner tenure and squared partner tenure 
become both non-significant. Later on, Chen et al. (2008) and Chi et al. (2011) find higher 
earnings quality in longer partner tenures. This result was reported after controlling for audit 
firm tenure.  
From a different approach, because their primary interest is not in the effects of partner 
tenure but in the related issue of the implications of mandatory partner rotation, Chi et al. (2009) 
conclude that partner rotation has not enhanced audit quality in China. The authors do not 
observe different levels of earnings quality among firms subject to mandatory partner rotation, 
when compared to both firms who rotate partners voluntarily and firms who do not rotate 
partners. However, more recent evidence for China reported by Lennox et al. (2014) has led to 
the opposite conclusion, as they find that the mandatory rotation of engagement partners has 
resulted in higher audit quality during the period surrounding rotation. Finally, Daugherty et al. 
(2012) examine audit partners’ perceptions of mandatory partner rotation and cooling-off 
periods in the US after the SOX Act. They conclude that partner rotation provisions have had an 
indirect negative impact on audit quality. 
Therefore, after the review of the theoretical literature and the available empirical evidence, 
we pose our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis # 2 (H2): the maximum level of audit quality is achieved under medium audit 
partner tenure.  
 While both hypotheses H1 and H2 address the individual effects of firm and partner tenure 
on audit quality, the main contribution of this paper is in the study of the interaction effects of 




(short, medium and long) with three partner tenure categories (short, medium and long).11 
According to the discussion in the introductory section, the study of interaction effects aims to 
provide a better knowledge of how audit quality behaves across the different combinations of 
firm and partner tenure. Consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2, if we expect that audit quality 
is maximized in medium firm tenure (H1) and medium partner tenure (H2), we would also expect 
that audit quality is maximized when medium firm tenure interacts with medium partner tenure. 
Therefore, we pose our third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis # 3 (H3): the maximum level of audit quality is achieved under medium firm 
and partner tenure.  
4. Model and sample selection 
4.1. Model 
We follow prior studies (e.g. Myers et al. 2003, Lim and Tan 2010) and measure audit quality 
by discretionary accruals. Thus, we assume that high-quality audits should lead to higher 
earnings quality by reducing the management of earnings through discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals are computed using the Jones (1991) model, as modified by Dechow et 
al. (1995): 
TAt/At-1= α 1(1/At-1) + α 2((ΔREVt -∆RECt) /At-1)) + α 3(PPEt/At-1) + εt (1) 
where: 
TAt is total accruals in year t; 
ΔREVt is revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
ΔRECt is net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1. 
PPEt is gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t; 
At-1 is total assets at the end of year t-1;  
α1, α2 and α3 are the parameters to be estimated; and 
εt is the error term. 
  
Francis and Wang (2008) point out the shortcomings of the usual approach of cross-sectional 
estimations of Jones (1991) model in international settings because of the small number of firm-
year observations in many industries. Therefore, they estimate current discretionary accruals as 
the difference between total accruals and predicted accruals, the latter calculated according to 
                                                          
11 Given the definitions of short and long tenures used in this paper, and considering that whenever a 
change of audit firm has occurred in our sample it has also involved a change of partner, there are no 
observations in the following combinations in our sample: short firm with long partner tenure, and short 




the firm’s previous year ratios. This approach allows us to overcome the small number of 
observations per industry, though it estimates discretionary accruals without taking advantage 
of any available information about the situation of other firms in the same industry, by using the 
same firm as its own control. Alternatively, Mora and Sabater (2008) overcome the problem of 
too few observations per industry, by computing discretionary accruals through panel data 
estimations of Jones model at the industry level with firm specific fixed effects and year specific 
dummy variables. Even though there is rarely one “correct” model to estimate discretionary 
accruals, and the different approaches are subject to one or other kind of limitation, following 
Mora and Sabater (2008) we perform panel data estimations of Jones model at the industry 
level. We base our decision on the fact that this approach takes advantage of the current 
situation of the company’s industry when computing discretionary accruals. 
To test hypotheses H1 and H2 developed in the previous section, in Equation (2) we propose 
a multivariate analysis with our experimental variables for firm and partner tenure and the 
control variables used in previous studies (e.g. Myers et al. 2003, Carey and Simnett 2006).  
Accruals = f (SF, LF, SP, LP, controls, year dummies, industry dummies)  (2) 
 
 Additionally, in order to test our hypothesis H3, in Equation (3) we include the interaction 
effects of firm and partner tenure: 
Accruals = f (SFSP, MFSP, MFLP, LFSP, LFMP, LFLP,  
controls, year dummies, industry dummies)    (3) 
 
where: 
Dependent Variable (Accruals): 
ABSDISAC: the absolute value of discretionary accruals.  
We measure audit quality by the quality of earnings as proxied by discretionary accruals 
in absolute values. However, to check the robustness of the results, we also study the 
following measures of accruals:  
 DISAC: signed discretionary accruals; 
 IIDISAC: income increasing discretionary accruals;  




EXABSDISAC: extreme discretionary accruals in absolute values. A dichotomous 
variable, which takes the value of 1 for those observations in the highest decile 
of ABSDISAC and 0 otherwise;  
EXIIDISAC: extreme income increasing discretionary accruals. A dichotomous 
variable, which takes the value of 1 for those observations in the highest decile 
of IIDISAC and 0 otherwise. 
 
Experimental variables are defined in Table 2 (panel A). The default categories for the 
experimental variables in Equation (2) are medium firm tenure (MF: observations with firm 
tenures between four and ten years) and medium partner tenure (MP: observations with 
partner tenures of four or five years), while in Equation (3) they are medium firm and partner 
tenure (MFMP: observations with firm tenures between four and ten years and four or five years 
of partner tenure).12  
The cut-off points to define short, medium and long firm and partner tenures have been 
chosen according to three criteria: economic significance for regulators and policy makers; the 
range in the continuous measures of firm and partner tenure in our sample; and the 
achievement of a minimum number of observations in each category. Regarding the first point, 
we chose 11 years as the minimum value to define a long-tenure relationship with the audit firm 
because the new 2014 EU Regulation states a maximum audit firm tenure of ten years. Similarly, 
we choose six years to define a long-term engagement with the audit partner because many 
countries (for example, the US, the UK or Spain after the 2015 Audit Law) have established a 
maximum tenure of five years with the lead audit partner. According to hypotheses H1, H2 and 
H3, we predict positive and statistically significant coefficients for all experimental variables in 
Equations (2) and (3). 
Insert Table 2 around here 
Next, we justify our control variables, defined in Table 2 (panel B), following prior research 
(e.g. Frankel et al. 2002, Johnson et al. 2002, Myers et al. 2003, Carey and Simnett 2006). PBANK 
accounts for the probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1984). We expect that a higher 
risk of bankruptcy is associated with a lower quality of earnings. The opinion of the audit report 
(OPINION) controls for an expected lower earnings quality for firms with qualified opinions 
                                                          
12 The Spanish branch of Arthur Andersen joined Deloitte in 2002, immediately after the fall of Arthur 
Andersen. Thus, Deloitte’s former Arthur Andersen clients did not change either the audit partner or the 
national local audit firm. Accordingly, in order to compute the number of years audited by the same audit 
firm, we consider that Arthur Andersen clients who moved to Deloitte in 2002 after the fall of Arthur 




(Carey and Simnett 2006). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), large firms are expected 
to show lower levels of accruals. Thus, with SIZE we attempt to capture the effects of the size of 
the firm on accruals. Since accruals are expected to differ across the firm’s life cycle (Anthony 
and Ramesh 1992, Dechow et al. 2001, Myers et al. 2003), we include the variable AGE. 
According to Becker et al. (1998), managers of highly leveraged firms (LEV) have stronger 
incentives to use discretionary accruals in order to manipulate earnings so as to avoid debt 
covenant violation. Since firms experiencing losses are expected to be more prone to manipulate 
earnings (Carey and Simnett 2006), we include LLOSS as a control variable. Dechow et al. (1995) 
point out that abnormal accruals models fail to completely extract non-discretionary accruals 
that are correlated with firm performance (PERFORM). Thus, income increasing (decreasing) 
accruals will be overestimated in high (low) earnings years.13 Following Myers et al. (2003), CFFO 
is included because firms with higher cash flow from operations are more likely to perform 
better (Frankel et al. 2002), and also because accruals and cash flows are negatively correlated 
on average (e.g. Dechow 1994, Sloan 1996). The inclusion of GROWTH as a control variable is 
consistent with prior research showing a positive relationship between accruals and growth 
opportunities (e.g. Myers et al. 2003, Carey and Simnett 2006). Thus, we predict a positive 
coefficient on GROWTH in all the estimations, with the only exception of the model with income-
decreasing accruals, where we expect a negative coefficient. Finally, AUDFIRM attempts to 
capture the fact that large audit firms are more conservative and, therefore, more willing to limit 
discretionary accruals (e.g. Becker et al. 1998, Francis et al. 1999).14 
4.2. Sample selection 
We perform the empirical analysis on the basis of non-financial firms quoted in the Spanish 
Stock Exchange (Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español) during the 2005-2011 research 
period. Complete information for all variables in the models is only available from year 2004 
onwards. However, as some variables require one year of lagged information, the research 
period starts in 2005. On the other hand, 2011 is the latest year for which information was 
available in our database. We trace back firm and partner tenure for each firm in our sample. 
Information about audit firm tenure is hand-collected from corporate governance reports, while 
the opinion of the audit report and the name of audit partners are obtained from financial 
                                                          
13 PERFORM is expected to show a positive effect (and positive sign) on income increasing accruals and a 
negative effect (and positive sign) on income decreasing accruals. Thus, similar to Carey and Simnett 
(2006) we do not predict the sign of the effect in the model with accruals in absolute values.  
14 However, Carey and Simnett (2006), Chen et al. (2008) and Chi et al. (2009) do not observe a significant 
effect of auditor type on accruals and Myers et al. (2003) report mixed results. All these studies were 




statements, available at the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) website. Finally, 
we collect data for control variables from Thomson Reuters Knowledge. Our sample consists of 
102 firms and 680 firm-year observations.15  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the study. Audit firm 
tenure has an average value of ten years with a maximum of 25 years. As discussed in the 
introduction section, these values are relatively high by international standards. On the other 
hand, average partner tenure is three years, well below the maximum legal tenure of seven 
years during our research period.16 Other interesting information would be that 14 percent of 
the audit reports have a qualified opinion and 19 percent of the firms report losses. The table 
also reveals extreme concentration (higher than 90 percent) of the Spanish audit market by Big 
4 firms. This market share is much higher than in Australia (64 percent in Carey and Simnett 
2006) or even in Taiwan (80 percent in Chi and Huang 2005). The examination of the correlation 
matrix (not reported) confirms the expected high correlations of PBANK with LEV (0.71) and 
PERFORM (-0.48). Apart from these cases, there are no other correlations greater than +/- 0.40.  
Insert Table 3 around here 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals in absolute values across 
categories of auditor tenure. We report mean and median values of ABSDISAC for firms under 
short (SF), medium (MF) and long (LF) firm tenure, and under short (SP), medium (MP) and long 
(LP) partner tenure. The table also provides the same information for each of the seven 
combinations resulting from the interaction between firm and partner tenure. As it can be seen, 
discretionary accruals remain rather stable across tenure groups. Both the t-test and the Mann-
Whitney test support this view, as differences in mean and median values are not statistically 
significant at the usual levels. 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 
5. Empirical results 
Given the panel structure of our dataset, we perform the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
test, which suggests the use of panel data estimation methods over ordinary least squares 
                                                          
15 Since some firms in the sample entered the Spanish stock market after 2005, the final number of firm-
year observations is lower than 714 (102 firms over seven years). 
16 Although, after the approval of the Financial Law in 2002 the maximum partner tenure was established 





regression in Equations (2) and (3). Afterwards, the Hausman test supports the use of random-
effects estimation in both equations. As expected, given the nature of the control variables, the 
modified Wald test indicates heteroscedasticity in the data. Therefore, we perform panel data 
estimations with random effects and robust standard errors.  
Table 5 presents the results of the estimations of Equation (2). Column A shows the results 
of the estimation conducted with ABSDISAC as the dependent variable. The estimation is globally 
significant (P-value < 0.00) and the proposed model shows high explanatory power in predicting 
discretionary accruals, for example, if compared to Carey and Simnett (2006) (4%), Manry et al. 
(2008) (19%) or Chen et al. (2008) (20%). Finally, after estimation we calculate variance inflation 
factors (not reported) in order to assess multicollinearity problems. The rather low values of 
these factors (average value of 1.72 with a maximum of 2.80) do not suggest serious 
multicollinearity problems.  
Insert Table 5 around here 
Regarding the experimental variables in the model, the main finding in Table 5 (column A) 
is the lack of significant effects of either firm or partner tenure on audit quality. Hence, results 
support neither hypothesis H1 nor hypothesis H2, as we do not observe higher levels of audit 
quality under medium firm or partner tenures, at the usual levels of significance. After the 
estimation of the model, we perform the Wald test to address whether one form of tenure 
dominates over the other. The results of the test do not support the dominance of any form of 
tenure. Our results for audit firm tenure would contradict prior evidence for the Spanish audit 
market reported by Monterrey and Sanchez (2007), who find a negative effect of tenure on 
discretionary accruals, and by Jara and Lopez (2007), who observe a non-monotonic effect. On 
the other hand, the non-significant effect of partner tenure on discretionary accruals has also 
been found by Carey and Simnett (2006) for Australia and by Chi and Huang (2005) for Taiwan, 
in the latter case after controlling for audit firm tenure.  
Results of the additional analyses conducted with discretionary accruals defined as DISAC, 
IIDISAC, IDDISAC, EXABSDISAC and EXIIDISAC are shown in columns B, C, D, E and F, respectively. 
They strongly support the results of the main analysis for audit firm tenure in column A, as the 
lack of a significant effect for SF and LF is also observed in each additional analysis. The only 
exception is SF in the model with signed discretionary accruals (DISAC), which shows marginal 
significance (P-value < 0.10) with a negative sign. Therefore, these additional analyses reinforce 




significant results are reported for both SP and LP in the estimations with DISAC and IIDISAC, and 
for SP in the model with EXIIDISAC, in all cases with the predicted sign. Overall, this suggests a 
moderate non-monotonic effect of partner tenure on audit quality. Although the results of the 
main analysis do not support hypothesis H2, it should be noted that whenever a significant effect 
is reported for partner tenure in any of the six estimations performed, it is always in the 
predicted direction, consistent with the hypothesis.   
Results for control variables in Table 5 (column A) show that, without exception, all the 
significant effects reported are in the predicted direction. Thus, firms with poor financial health 
(PBANK and LLOSS) present significantly higher levels of ABSDISAC. Conversely, large firms show 
lower ABSDISAC (P-value < 0.10). Also as expected, ABSDISAC depends positively on GROWTH 
and negatively on CFFO. Similar to Carey and Simnett (2006), we do not predict the sign for 
PERFORM. Results indicate that performance is positively associated with discretionary accruals. 
However, we fail to find significant results for OPINION, AGE, LEV or AUDFIRM. In the additional 
analyses (columns B, C, D, E and F), results for control variables reveal that PBANK does not 
significantly affect either IDDISAC or extreme accruals. While it is rather plausible that firms in 
poor financial conditions will more likely manage earnings through income increasing than 
income decreasing accruals, it is more difficult to understand the lack of significance of PBANK 
in the models with extreme accruals. The opinion of the audit report (OPINION) has a modest 
effect on discretionary accruals, being statistically significant only in the model with 
EXABSDISAC, with the predicted positive sign. As Carey and Simnett (2006) and Chen et al. 
(2008), our results suggest that audit quality does not depend on the type of audit firm. 
However, in our study, the lack of significance of AUDFIRM may also be explained by the extreme 
level of concentration of the Spanish audit market by Big-4 firms.  
We perform several additional tests to check the robustness of the findings. Firstly, we 
control for audit firm changes, as the new audit firm might require important adjustments in the 
client’s financial statements, leading to abnormal levels of accruals without necessarily 
indicating lower audit quality. Hence, we reestimate Equation (2) after the removal of 44 firm-
year observations of firms that changed their audit firm in the current year. Results (not 
reported) do not show any significant differences compared with those in Table 5. Secondly, we 
check the robustness of results to the macroeconomic environment. Given the higher auditor 
litigation risk during economic downturns, the impact of tenure on audit quality might be 
conditioned to macroeconomic conditions. To conduct this analysis, we perform separate 
estimations of Equation (2) for the subperiods: 2005-2007 (economic growth) and 2008-2011 




Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the model with interaction effects given by 
Equation (3). The examination of the coefficients and statistical significance of experimental 
variables allows us to test for hypothesis H3. According to this hypothesis we expect positive 
sign and significant results for all the experimental variables in the model. This would indicate a 
lower audit quality for each alternative category, if compared with the medium firm and partner 
tenure (MFMP) default group. Focusing on the results of the estimation with discretionary 
accruals in absolute values (column A), all the experimental variables present positive 
coefficients and, with the only exception of MFLP, these coefficients are statistically significant 
or marginally significant. The positive coefficient on MFLP indicates higher levels of discretionary 
accruals in the MFLP group compared to the default group, although this result is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, audit quality is significantly lower (P-value < 0.10) in five of the six 
alternative combinations to MFMP and lower, though non-significant, in the sixth combination. 
Overall, these results provide support for hypothesis H3 stating that audit quality is maximized 
when medium firm and partner tenure interact.  
Insert Table 6 around here 
As in Table 5, results of the additional analyses with discretionary accruals defined as DISAC, 
IIDISAC, IDDISAC, EXABSDISAC and EXIIDISAC are shown in columns B, C, D, E and F, respectively. 
In general, results for the most usual measures of discretionary accruals (ABSDISAC, DISAC and 
IIDISAC) provide support for our hypothesis H3. Hence, we report significant or marginally 
significant results for 12 of the 18 experimental variables and, with no exception, with the 
predicted sign. Among these cases we find the variable MFLP, non-significant in the main model 
with ABSDISAC, but marginally significant in the model with IIDISAC. Therefore, our former 
conclusion from the main analysis regarding the overall support for hypothesis H3, is reinforced 
after these additional analyses. According to the aim of this paper, it should be noted that the 
significant effects of tenure on audit quality shown in Table 6 had remained largely undetected 
in the study of individual effects in Table 5. Therefore, the comparison of column A in Tables 5 
and 6 stresses the importance of studying the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure in 
order to get a more complete picture of the impact of tenure on audit quality.  
In the former section we argue that, due to data limitations, we do not use the standard 
cross-sectional industry estimations of Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary accruals, 
but as Mora and Sabater (2008) we perform panel data estimations at the industry level. 
However, Francis and Wang (2008) propose an alternative method to overcome the data 




data, and not through estimation. We justify the choice of Mora and Sabater (2008) approach, 
because it allows us to take advantage of intra-industry information for the calculation of 
discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, to check the sensitivity of results to the accruals estimation 
method, we reestimate Equations (2) and (3), with ABSDISAC calculated as in Francis and Wang 
(2008). Results of the new estimations (not reported) do not indicate significant effects for any 
of the experimental variables. These results support those displayed in Table 5 showing no 
significant effects of firm or partner tenure when they are individually considered, but they are 
not consistent with Table 6, where we observe significant effects for most of the interaction 
variables.17 Therefore, the evidence reported in Table 6 on the impact of the interaction of firm 
and partner tenure on audit quality needs to be carefully taken as it is sensitive to the approach 
used to calculate discretionary accruals.  
In the introduction section we refer to the relatively long audit firm tenures in Spain by 
international standards. As an example, almost 20 percent of our sample show audit firm 
tenures of 18 years or longer. These rather long tenures in the Spanish audit market provide an 
interesting setting for the study of the implications of extremely long audit engagements. Hence, 
to address this issue we estimate Equation (4):  
Accruals = f (EXFSP, EXFLP, controls, year dummies, industry dummies)  (4) 
 
The experimental variables are: 
 EXFSP: Extremely long audit firm tenure (18 years or more) and short partner tenure 
(four years or less). 
 EXFLP: Extremely long audit firm tenure (18 years or more) and long partner tenure 
(more than four years). 
 We choose a cut-off point of 18 years because it defines the quintile of firms with the longest 
tenures. Moreover, in order to guarantee a minimum number of firm-year observations in each 
tenure group, we consider only two groups of partner tenure in this analysis.  
Insert Table 7 around here 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the explanatory power of the model with the new definition of discretionary 
accruals drops from 52 to 21 percent, with only three control variables (PBANK, SIZE and AGE) showing 
significant effects, none of them at the one percent level. This would further support the use of Mora and 




Table 7 presents the results of the estimations of Equation (4). For the model with ABSDISAC 
(column A) we do not observe significant results for either EXFSP or EXFLP. Thus, we conclude 
that the longest audit firm tenures in the Spanish audit market do not seem to be a problem in 
terms of audit quality, even when they interact with long partner tenures. The additional 
analyses (columns B, C, D, E and F) provide reinforced support for this conclusion. Hence, we 
find significant results only for EXFLP (in the model with IIDISAC) and marginally significant 
results for EXFSP (in the model with EXIIDISAC). As expected, results for control variables do not 
differ much from those in Tables 5 and 6, the main difference being that OPINION becomes 
marginally significant in the main model, with the predicted positive sign.  
We check the robustness of these findings to other definitions of long tenures (results not 
reported). Hence, for extreme tenures defined as 20 years or longer, results for the main model 
with ABSDISAC continue to show lack of significance for EXFSP or EXFLP, and the same holds if 
extreme tenures are defined as 15 years or longer. Moreover, results for EXFLP in the model 
with IIDISAC and for EXFSP in the model with EXIIDISAC are no longer significant in any of the 
new estimations. This check therefore reinforces our former conclusion that the rather long 
audit firm tenures in Spain do not seem to involve particularly negative implications for audit 
quality.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Despite mandatory partner rotation rules currently enforced in many jurisdictions, 
regulators and policy-makers are still concerned about the potentially negative impact of long 
audit tenures on audit quality. As a clear example of this concern, the 2014 EU Regulation has 
established, among other things, the mandatory rotation of the audit firm in the EU. Not 
surprisingly, the new regulation has generated considerable controversy in the audit profession 
and has encouraged further research on the impact of auditor tenure on audit quality.   
The results of this paper lead us to draw several conclusions. Firstly, without considering 
interaction effects, firm and partner tenure seem to play a very modest role as determinants of 
audit quality. This would be in line with some of the evidence available for Spain as well as for 
other countries. Secondly, the impact of partner tenure, although weak, seems to be stronger 
than the effects of audit firm tenure. Thirdly and most importantly, as it is directly related with 
the aim of this paper, the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on audit quality seem to 




interaction effects would provide a more complete picture of the tenure-audit quality 
relationship. Regarding this issue, our results suggest that audit quality is maximized when 
medium firm tenure interacts with medium partner tenure.  
The results reported here may have implications at the EU level. Given the low litigation risk 
(Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 2004) and relatively long audit firm tenures, Spain is an ideal setting in 
which to observe an impairment of audit quality with tenure. Since this does not seem to be the 
case, we should not expect a strong negative impact of audit firm tenure on audit quality at the 
EU level.  
This study is subject to various limitations. First is the relatively small size of the Spanish 
audit market for listed companies, which causes some categories in the analysis of interaction 
effects to include few observations. Moreover, the significant effects reported for the 
interaction variables of firm and partner tenure are not robust to the use of an alternative 
approach to calculate discretionary accruals. Therefore, the sensitivity of results to different 
accrual models may also be considered a limitation of this study. These shortcomings need to 
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Table 1. Summary of regulatory changes on audit firm and partner rotation in Spain 
 
 1988 Audit 
Law 
 
1995 Reform 2002 Financial 
Law  
2011 Audit Law 2015 Audit Law 
 
Maximum firm tenure nine years none none none ten years 
Maximum partner tenure none none seven years (it 
applies to the 
audit team) 
seven years five years 
Renewal of the contract 
with the audit firm after 
the first contract 
not possible annually annually periods of tree 
years 











Table 2. Variable definitions 
Panel A. Experimental variables 
SF short firm tenure: less than four years 
LF long firm tenure: more than ten years 
SP short partner tenure: less than four years 
LP long partner tenure: more than five years 
SFSP short firm and partner tenure: less than four years of firm tenure and less than four 
years of partner tenure 
MFSP medium firm and short partner tenure: between four and ten years of firm tenure and 
less than four years of partner tenure 
MFLP medium firm and long partner tenure: between four and ten years of firm tenure and 
more than five years of partner tenure 
LFSP long firm and short partner tenure: more than ten years of firm tenure and less than 
four years of partner tenure 
LFMP long firm and medium partner tenure: more than ten years of firm tenure and four or 
five years of partner tenure 
 LFLP long firm and partner tenure: more than ten years of firm tenure and more than five 
years of partner tenure 
 
Panel B. Control variables 
PBANK probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijewski scores, with the 
weights proposed by Carcello et al. (1995) 
OPINION 1 if the company has received a qualified opinion and 0 otherwise 
SIZE natural logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end 
AGE natural logarithm of the number of years the company has been listed by the 
supervisor of the Spanish stock market 
LEV total liabilities divided by total assets at financial year-end 
LLOSS 1 if client reported a loss for the previous year and 0 otherwise 
PERFORM earnings before tax over total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
CFFO cash flow from operations over total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
GROWTH change in assets from prior year 








Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN ST. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
PBANK -3.18 -3.20 1.41 -7.21 2.74 
OPINION 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
SIZE  6.84 6.64 1.75 1.51 11.77 
SIZE (in millions of €) 4,720.62 762 13,483.89 4.53 129,314.20 
AGE  2.61 2.89 0.62 0.00 3.26 
AGE (in years) 15.23 18.00 6.99 1.00 25.00 
LEV 0.67 0.68 0.21 0.08 2.25 
LLOSS 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
PERFORM 0.04 0.04 0.15 -0.54 1.90 
CFFO 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.47 0.66 
GROWTH 0.29 0.05 1.85 -0.65 40.95 
AUDFIRM 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
FIRM TENURE  10.05 9.00 6.59 1.00 25.00 




PBANK: probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijewski scores, with the weights proposed 
by Carcello et al. (1995);  
OPINION: 1 if the company receives a qualified opinion and 0 otherwise;  
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end;  
AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years the company is included in the Register of the supervisor of 
the Spanish stock market;  
LEV: total liabilities divided by total assets at financial year-end;  
LLOSS: 1 if client reported a loss for the previous year and 0 otherwise;  
PERFORM: earnings before tax over total assets at the end of the fiscal year;  
CFFO: cash flow from operations over total assets at the end of the fiscal year;  
GROWTH: change in assets from prior year; 
AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a non-Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise;  
FIRM TENURE: the number of consecutive years a firm has been audited by the same audit firm. 
PARTNER TENURE: the number of consecutive years a firm has been audited by the same audit partner. 
 
Neither FIRM TENURE nor PARTNER TENURE has been used in the empirical analysis as audit tenure has been included 
through categorical variables. However, they are in the table because provide useful information about audit tenure 






Table 4. Mean and median values of ABSDISAC for the whole sample and across subsamples  
Audit tenure ABSDISAC 
Mean Median 
Whole sample (n=680) 0.057 0.051 
SF (n=181) 0.055 0.054 
MF (n=233) 0.056 0.053 
LF (n=266) 0.057 0.049 
SP (n=422) 0.056 0.052 
MP (n=160) 0.059 0.048 
LP (n=98) 0.055  0.056 
SFSP (n=137) 0.055 0.057 
MFSP (n=126) 0.055 0.049 
MFMP (n=82) 0.060 0.050 
MFLP (n=49) 0.061 0.060 
LFSP (n=157) 0.058 0.051 
LFMP (n=80) 0.059 0.047 
LFLP (n=49) 0.049  0.044 
 
 
ABSDISAC: the absolute value of discretionary accruals; 
SF (short firm tenure): less than four years; 
MF (medium firm tenure): between four and ten years; 
LF (long firm tenure): more than ten years; 
SP (short partner tenure): less than four years; 
MP (medium partner tenure): four or five years; 
LP (long partner tenure): more than five years; 
SFSP (short firm and partner tenure): less than four years of firm and less than four years of partner tenure; 
MFSP (medium firm and short partner tenure): between four and ten years of firm and less than four years of partner 
tenure; 
MFMP (medium firm and partner tenure): between four and ten years of firm and four or five years of partner tenure; 
MFLP (medium firm and long partner tenure): between four and ten years of firm and more than five years of partner 
tenure; 
LFSP (long firm and short partner tenure): more than ten years of firm and less than four years of partner tenure; 
LFMP (long firm and medium partner tenure): more than ten years of firm and four or five years of partner tenure; 





Table 5. Results of the multivariate analysis. Estimations without interaction effects. Main 
analysis in column A and additional analyses in columns B, C, D, E and F 
 











































































































































































































*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
 
ABSDISAC: absolute value of discretionary accruals; DISAC: discretionary accruals in raw values; IIDISAC: income 
increasing discretionary accruals; IDDISAC: income decreasing discretionary accruals; EXABSDISAC: extreme 
discretionary accruals in absolute values; EXIIDISAC: extreme income increasing discretionary accruals; SF (short firm 
tenure): less than four years; LF (long firm tenure): more than ten years; SP (short partner tenure): less than four 
years; LP (long partner tenure): more than five years; PBANK: probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted 
Zmijewski scores, with the weights proposed by Carcello et al. (1995); OPINION: 1 if the company receives a qualified 
opinion and 0 otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end; AGE: natural 
logarithm of the number of years the company has been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: 
total liabilities divided by total assets at financial year-end; LLOSS: 1 if client reported a loss for the previous year and 
0 otherwise;  PERFORM: earnings before tax over total assets at the end of the fiscal year; CFFO: cash flow from 
operations over total assets at the end of the fiscal year; GROWTH: change in assets from prior year; AUDFIRM: 1 if 







Table 6. Results of the multivariate analysis. Estimations with the joint effects of firm and 
partner tenure. Main analysis in column A and additional analyses in columns B, C, D, E and F 
 



































































































































































































































*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
 
ABSDISAC: absolute value of discretionary accruals; DISAC: discretionary accruals in raw values; IIDISAC: income 
increasing discretionary accruals; IDDISAC: income decreasing discretionary accruals; EXABSDISAC: extreme 
discretionary accruals in absolute values; EXIIDISAC: extreme income increasing discretionary accruals; SFSP (short 
firm and partner tenure): less than four years of firm and less than four years of partner tenure; MFSP (medium firm 
and short partner tenure): between four and ten years of firm and less than four years of partner tenure; MFLP 
(medium firm and long partner tenure): between four and ten years of firm and more than five years of partner 
tenure; LFSP (long firm and short partner tenure): more than ten years of firm and less than four years of partner 
tenure; LFMP (long firm and medium partner tenure): more than ten years of firm and four or five years of partner 
tenure; LFLP (long firm and partner tenure): more than ten years of firm and more than five years of partner tenure; 
PBANK: probability of bankruptcy as measured; OPINION: 1 if the company receives a qualified opinion and 0 
otherwise; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end; AGE: natural logarithm of the 
number of years the company has been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total liabilities 
divided by total assets; LLOSS: 1 if client reported a loss for the previous year and 0 otherwise;  PERFORM: earnings 
before tax over total assets; CFFO: cash flow from operations over total assets; GROWTH: change in assets from prior 





Table 7. Results of the multivariate analysis. Study of extremely long audit firm tenures. Main 
analysis in column A and additional analyses in columns B, C, D, E and F 
 



















































































































































































*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
 
ABSDISAC: absolute value of discretionary accruals; DISAC: discretionary accruals in raw values; IIDISAC: income 
increasing discretionary accruals; IDDISAC: income decreasing discretionary accruals; EXABSDISAC: extreme 
discretionary accruals in absolute values; EXIIDISAC: extreme income increasing discretionary accruals; EXFSP: 
extremely long audit firm tenure (18 years or more) and short partner tenure (four years or less); EXFLP: extremely 
long audit firm tenure (18 years or more) and long partner tenure (more than four years); PBANK: probability of 
bankruptcy as measured; OPINION: 1 if the company receives a qualified opinion and 0 otherwise; SIZE: natural 
logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end; AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years the 
company has been listed by the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total liabilities divided by total assets; 
LLOSS: 1 if client reported a loss for the previous year and 0 otherwise;  PERFORM: earnings before tax over total 
assets; CFFO: cash flow from operations over total assets; GROWTH: change in assets from prior year; AUDFIRM: 1 if 
the company is audited by a non-Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
